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Abstract
This paper shows that some classes of relaxed sequencing games, which arise from the class of
sequencing games as introduced in Curiel, Pederzoli, Tijs (1989), are balanced.
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1 Introduction
Sequencing games, introduced by Curiel, Pederzoli, Tijs (1989), are cooperative combinatorial
optimization games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations. They introduced and char-
acterized the Equal Gain Splitting (EGS) rule that generates a core element for the corresponding
sequencing game. Moreover, they showed that sequencing games are convex. Hamers, Suijs, Borm,
Tijs (1996) introduced and characterized the split core, a set solution which is a generalization of
the EGS-rule and yields a re¯nement of the core. Curiel, Potters, Rajendra Prasad, Tijs, Veltman
(1993,1994) showed that balancedness is preserved if the cost function is generalized.
A new direction in this game theoretical research is established by studying sequencing games
that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which restrictions on the jobs are imposed.
Hamers, Borm, Tijs (1995) impose ready times on the jobs. In this case the corresponding sequenc-
ing games are balanced, but not necessarily convex. However, for a special subclass convexity is
established. Similar results are obtained in Borm, Fiestras-Janeiro, Hamers, S¶ anchez, Voorneveld
(2002) and Hamers, Klijn, van Velzen (2002). The ¯rst consider sequencing situation in which due
dates play a role and the second consider sequencing situations in which precedence constraints are
involved.
Another direction in this area has been found in extending the number of machines. Hamers,
Klijn, Suijs (1999) consider sequencing situations with m parallel and identical machines. These
games are balanced if only two machines are present. If three or more machines are present
balancedness is proven for a special class. Calleja, Borm, Hamers, Klijn, Slikker (2001) prove bal-
ancedness for a special class of sequencing games that arise from two-machine sequencing situations
in which a di®erent type of cost criterion is considered. Van den Nouweland, Krabbenborg, Potters
(1992) obtained some balancedness results for sequencing games that arise from multiple machine
sequencing situations with a dominant machine.
In all previous mentioned sequencing games the value of a coalition is obtained by taking an
admissible rearrangement that maximizes the cost savings of this coalition. These admissible rear-
rangements have the same feature that two players can only exchange their position in a queue if
all players in between these two players in that queue are also member of this coalition. In Curiel,
Potters, Rajendra Prasad, Tijs, Veltman (1993) it is argued that this set of admissible rearrange-
ments is too restrictive. In fact, they propose to investigate sequencing games in which the set of
admissible rearrangements is relaxed, i.e. rearrangements in which players of a coalition can switch
1positions in a queue, even if not necessarily all players in between these two players are member of
this coalition. This paper tackles this issue by relaxing the set of admissible rearrangements. This
has resulted in the investigation of weak-relaxed, relaxed and rigid sequencing games. Hence, for
all these games coalitions have di®erent sets of admissible rearrangements they can use to optimize
their cost savings than in the classical approach of sequencing games.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 recalls sequencing situations and games
as introduced in Curiel, Pederzoli, Tijs (1989). Section 3 discusses weak-relaxed and relaxed
sequencing games. For the class of weak-relaxed sequencing games a core element is provided and
some balancedness results with respect to relaxed sequencing games are discussed. Finally, Section
4 shows that the class of rigid sequencing games is balanced.
2 Sequencing situations and games
In this section we describe the class of sequencing situations and the corresponding games as intro-
duced in Curiel et al. (1989). Before that we will recall some notions from cooperative game theory.
A cooperative game is a pair (N;v) where N is a ¯nite (player-)set and v, the characteristic function,
is a map v : 2N ! R with v(;) = 0. The map v assigns to each subset S ½ N, called a coalition, a
real number v(S) called the worth of S. The core of a game (N;v) is the set
C(v) = fx 2 RNjx(S) ¸ v(S) for every S ½ N;x(N) = v(N)g;
where x(S) =
P
i2S xi. Intuitively the core is the set of payo® vectors for which no coalition has
an incentive to split o® from the grand coalition. The core can be an empty set. If the core is
nonempty, the game is called balanced.
A cooperative game (N;v) is called superadditive if
v(S) + v(T) · v(S [ T) for all S;T ½ N with S \ T = ;;
and convex if for all S;T ½ N it holds
v(S [ T) + v(S \ T) ¸ v(S) + v(T):
Note, that convex games are balanced (Shapley (1971)).
Now we will describe the class of sequencing games as introduced in Curiel et al. (1989). In
a sequencing situation there are n agents waiting in front of a machine. Each agent has a job that
has to be processed on that machine. The set of agents will be denoted by N = f1;:::;ng. A
processing order will be denoted by a bijection ¾ : f1;:::;ng ! N which describes the position of
each agent in the queue. Formally, ¾(i) = j means that agent j is in the i-th position in the queue.
It is assumed that there is an initial processing order ¾0. The set of all processing orders is denoted
by ¼(N). For every agent i 2 N the positive processing time equals pi. Further, it is assumed
that for every agent i 2 N the cost function ci is described by a function ci : [0;1) ! R de¯ned
by ci(t) = ®it, with ®i > 0 the cost per time unit. The completion time of agent i with respect
to the processing order ¾ is de¯ned by C¾;i :=
P
j:¾¡1(j)·¾¡1(i)pj. The above described sequenc-
ing situation will be denoted by a quadruple (N;¾0;®;p), with N = f1;:::;ng the set of agents,
¾0 : f1;:::;ng ! N the initial order, ® = (®i)i2N 2 RN
+ the cost vector and p = (pi)i2N 2 RN
+ the
processing times. For convenience, we assume in this paper that ¾0 is the identity bijection, i.e.
¾0(i) = i for every i 2 N.
2Next we focus on the cost resulting from a processing order. The total cost of all agents with
respect to the processing order ¾ is given by c¾(N) =
P
i2N ®iC¾;i. Clearly, there must be a pro-
cessing order for which the cost is minimal. Smith (1956) showed that the total cost of the group is
minimized if and only if the agents are lined up in decreasing order of urgency indices. The urgency
index ui of agent i is equal to ®i
pi . Formally, for a sequencing situation (N;¾0;®;p) we have that
c¼(N) = min¾2¼(N) c¾(N) if and only if u¼(1) ¸ u¼(2) ¸ ¢¢¢ ¸ u¼(n).
Now we describe sequencing games as introduced in Curiel et al. (1989). Let (N;¾0;®;p) be a
sequencing situation and let ¼ be an optimal processing order of N. The maximal cost savings for
coalition N are equal to c¾0(N)¡c¼(N). Now we want to determine the maximal cost savings for
each coalition S. For this we have to agree which rearrangements of S are admissible with respect
to the initial order ¾0. Curiel et al. (1989) called a rearrangement for coalition S admissible with
respect to the initial order if it is described by a bijection ¾ : f1;:::;ng ! N such that each
player outside S remains in his initial position and and no jumps take place over players outside
S. Formally, these two conditions can be summarised in the following equation:
(i;¾) = (i;¾0) for all i 2 NnS (1)
where (i;¿) = fj 2 N : ¿¡1(j) < ¿¡1(i)g is the set of predecessors of i with respect to ¿, excluding
i. We denote the set of these admissible rearrangements for coalition S by A(S). The worth of











Curiel et al. (1989) showed that sequencing games are convex games. As a consequence these
games are balanced.
3 Weak-relaxed sequencing games
In this section we consider weak-relaxed and relaxed sequencing games. We show that weak-relaxed
sequencing games are balanced.
In sequencing games as introduced in Curiel et al. (1989), referred to as classical sequencing games,
the value of a coalition is obtained by taking an admissible rearrangement that maximizes the cost
savings of this coalition. In such an admissible rearrangement, two players can only exchange their
position in the queue if all players in between these two players are also member of this coalition.
In weak-relaxed sequencing games we weaken this requirement. We assume that one speci¯c player
j can switch with any player in the coalition provided that the players outside this coalition do not
su®er from this switch. So player j is allowed to switch with a player in front of him in the queue
if this player has a larger processing time, and with a player behind him in the queue if this player
has a smaller processing time. Because there is one player with a special property, we denote the
weak-relaxed sequencing situation by (N;j;¾0;®;p), where j 2 N is the player with the special
property and N;¾0;® and p are the same as in Section 2.
Let (N;j;¾0;®;p) be a weak-relaxed sequencing situation. To de¯ne the set of admissible orders
WRj(S) with respect to the initial order we need to distinguish between two sets of coalitons:
coalitions that include player j and coalitions that do not include player j. For coalition S ½ N
that does not include j, i.e. j 62 S, the set of admissible orders is equal to the set of admissible
rearrangements in the classical sequencing games, i.e. the set of admissible rearrangements is A(S).
3For coalition S ½ N that does include player j, i.e. j 2 S, a reordering ¾ is called admissible if it
leaves the positions of the players in NnS ¯xed, at most one jump takes places (of player j with
another player in S), and the completion time of the players outside S does not increase. Formally
these demands can be expressed as
C¾0;k ¸ C¾;k for all k 2 NnS
and for an m 2 S
(k;¾) \ (NnS) = (k;¾0) \ (NnS) for all k 2 Snfj;mg:











Note that, because for all S ½ N we have A(S) ½ WRj(S), it holds that v(S) · w(S) for all
S ½ N. Moreover, as a consequence of A(N) = WRj(N), we have that v(N) = w(N).
Example 1 Let (N;j;¾0;®;p) be a weak-relaxed sequencing situation with N = f1;2;3g, j = 3,
® = (2;3;5) and p = (2;1;1). The corresponding weak-relaxed sequencing game (N;w) is displayed
in Table 1. We explain w(13). Because p1 ¸ p3 we have that WR3(13) = f123;321g. Therefore
w(13) = max(0;®3(p1+p2)¡®1(p2+p3)) = max(0;11) = 11. Note that in the classical sequencing
game that arises from (N;¾0;®;p) we have v(13) = 0.
S 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
w(S) 0 0 0 4 11 2 14
Table 1: Weak-relaxed sequencing game
Similar to classical sequencing games it is easy to show that weak-relaxed sequencing games are
superadditive. Contrary to the classical sequencing games, weak-relaxed sequencing games do not
belong to the class of convex games.
Example 2 Consider (N;w) as in Example 1. Then w(1) = 0, w(12) = 4, w(13) = 11 and
w(N) = 14. This implies that w(13) ¡ w(1) = 11 > w(N) ¡ w(12) = 10. Hence (N;w) is not
convex.
The next theorem shows that weak-relaxed sequencing games have a non-empty core. From Exam-
ple 1 we see that w(13) 6= w(1) + w(3) which implies that weak-relaxed sequencing games are not
¾0-component additive games (cf. Potters, Reijnierse (1995)), in contrary to classical sequencing
games. Hence, balancedness of weak-relaxed sequencing games cannot be established using the
balancedness of ¾0-component additive games.
We will show that weak-relaxed sequencing games are permutationally convex games. For the
notion of permutationally convexity we ¯rst need to introduce permutations. A permutation ¼,
denoted by ¼ = ¼(1):::¼(n), is a bijection ¼ : f1;:::;ng ! N. In this paper a permutation should
be interpreted as an order of the player set. Let [l;¼] be the set of predecessors of l 2 N including
l, i.e. [l;¼] = fj 2 N : ¼¡1(j) · ¼¡1(l)g. A game is called permutationally convex if there exists
a permutation ¼ such that for all i;k 2 f1;:::;ng with ¼¡1(i) < ¼¡1(k) and S ½ Nn[k;¼] the
following inequalities are satis¯ed:
4v([i;¼] [ S) ¡ v([i;¼]) · v([k;¼] [ S) ¡ v([k;¼]) (2)
v(S) · v([k;¼] [ S) ¡ v([k;¼]): (3)
Granot, Huberman (1982) showed that permutationally convex games are balanced by showing
that the marginal vector m¼(v) := (v([1;¼]) ¡ v((1;¼));:::;v([n;¼]) ¡ v((n;¼)) is in the core.
Theorem 1 Weak-relaxed sequencing games are balanced.
Proof: Let (N;j;¾0;®;p) be a weak-relaxed sequencing situation and let (N;w) be the corre-
sponding weak-relaxed sequencing game. Let (N;¾0;®;p) be a classical sequencing situation and
let (N;v) be the corresponding classical sequencing game.
Now take ¼ = j ¡1:::1 j +1:::n j. We will show that (2) and (3) are satis¯ed, which implies
that (N;v) is permutationally convex.
Let i;k 2 N such that ¼¡1(i) < ¼¡1(k), i.e. i is a predecessor of k with respect to ¼. Weak-relaxed
sequencing games are superadditive games and hence (3) is satis¯ed. Therefore it is su±cient to
show that (2) holds.
Suppose that k = j. Then [k;¼] = N, henceforth S = ;, which proves (2). So we may assume that
k 6= j. This implies that j 62 [i;¼] ½ [k;¼]. Hence, w([i;¼]) = v([i;¼]) and w([k;¼]) = v([k;¼]).
Now let S ½ Nn[k;¼] and let ¾opt(S [ [i;¼]) 2 WR(S [ [i;¼]) denote the optimal reordering of
coalition S [ [i;¼]. We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: ¾opt(S [ [i;¼]) 2 A(S [ [i;¼]). This implies that w(S [ [i;¼]) = v(S [ [i;¼]).
By de¯nition,
w(S [ [k;¼]) ¸ v(S [ [k;¼]):
So,
w(S [ [k;¼]) ¡ w(S [ [i;¼]) ¸ v(S [ [k;¼]) ¡ v(S [ [i;¼])
¸ v([k;¼]) ¡ v([i;¼]) = w([k;¼]) ¡ w([i;¼]);
where the second inequality follows from the convexity of the classical sequencing games.
Case 2: ¾opt(S [ [i;¼]) 62 A(S [ [i;¼]). In this case player j switches with a player, say player
m, from a di®erent component. Because fjg [ [k;¼] is connected with respect to the initial order
¾0, we have that m 62 [k;¼]. We will provide the proof for the case that j > m, the proof for
j < m runs similar and is therefore omitted. The optimal order of S[[i;¼] can be attained by ¯rst
switching players j and m and then putting each component in decreasing order of urgency indices.
Therefore the total cost savings of S[[i;¼] can be decomposed into two parts: ¯rst the cost savings
obtained by only switching j and m, and, second, the cost savings by putting the players in each
component in decreasing order of urgency indices. First, the cost savings obtained by switching j
and m, denoted by Si
jm, equal
Si




5Second, the cost savings that can be obtained by putting the players in each component S [ [i;¼]
in decreasing order of urgency indices can be expressed using classical sequencing games. Because
after the switch of players j and m two initial components have changed these cost savings are
equal to the cost savings of the classical sequencing game that arise from the sequencing situation
(N;¾;®;p) with ¾ such that ¾(i) = i for all i 2 f1;:::;ngnfj;mg, ¾(j) = m and ¾(m) = j. Let
(N;v¾) be the corresponding classical sequencing game. Now the cost savings obtained by putting
the players in decreasing order of urgency indices equal v¾(S [ [i;¼]). Therefore
w(S [ [i;¼]) = Si
jm + v¾(S [ [i;¼]): (4)
Now we look at the cost savings coalition S[[k;¼] can obtain. For coalition S[[k;¼] we rearrange
the initial order ¾0, even if j and m are in the same component, as follows. First we switch players j
and m and, second, we put each component in decreasing order of urgency indices. This is certainly
an admissible rearrangement, but it is not necessarily optimal.
The cost savings of the switch of j and m, denoted by Sk
jm, is equal to
Sk




After the switch of j and m, coalition S [ [k;¼] can obtain extra cost savings by putting each
components in decreasing order of urgency indices. By expressing these extra cost savings in terms
of the classical sequencing game (N;v¾) we obtain,
w(S [ [k;¼]) ¸ Sk
jm + v¾(S [ [k;¼]): (5)
Because pj ¸ pm and [i;¼] ½ [k;¼] it holds that Sk
jm ¸ Si
jm. Therefore
w(S [ [k;¼]) ¸ Si
jm + v¾(S [ [k;¼])
Now we obtain
w(S [ [k;¼]) ¡ w(S [ [i;¼]) ¸ v¾(S [ [k;¼]) ¡ v¾(S [ [i;¼])
¸ v¾([k;¼]) ¡ v¾([i;¼]) = w([k;¼]) ¡ w([i;¼]):
The ¯rst inequality holds by (4) and (5), the second inequality follows from the convexity of clas-
sical sequencing games and the equality follows from j;m 62 [k;¼]. ¤
As a consequence, the marginal vector m¼(w) is a core-element, where ¼ = j ¡1¢¢¢1 j +1¢¢¢n j.
Example 3 Let (N;w) be a weak-relaxed sequencing game for which N = f1;:::;7g and j = 3.
Then m¼(w) 2 C(w) with ¼ = 2145673.
In the ¯nal part of this section we discuss relaxed sequencing games, which are games that arise
from sequencing situations where every player is allowed to jump over other players as long as
the interests of the players outside the coalition are not hurt. Let (N;¾0;®;p) be a sequencing
situation. An order ¾ is called relaxed admissible for coalition S with respect to the initial order if
it leaves the position of the players in NnS ¯xed, and the completion time of players in NnS does
not increase. Formally, the set of admissible rearrangements of a coalition S satis¯es the following
two properties and will be denoted by R(S),
¾(j) = j for all j 2 NnS
6and
C¾;j · C¾0;j for all j 2 NnS:











for all S ½ N. Note that because A(S) ½ WRj(S) ½ R(S) for every S ½ N, we have that
v(S) · w(S) · z(S) for each S ½ N. Moreover, because A(N) = WRj(N) = R(N), it holds that
v(N) = w(N) = z(N).
Example 4 Let (N;¾0;®;p) be a sequencing situation with N = f1;2;3;4g, ® = (2;1;4;3) and
p = (1;1;1;1). The corresponding relaxed sequencing game is printed in Table 2.
S i 12 13 14 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 N
z(S) 0 0 4 3 3 4 0 5 5 5 5 8
Table 2: Relaxed sequencing game.
Observe that the coalitions f1;3g and f2;4g have a positive value, a situation that can not occur
in weak relaxed sequencing games.
Because a 3-player relaxed sequencing game is a weak-relaxed sequencing game with j = 3, these
games are balanced. In Hamers (1988) it is shown that 4-player relaxed sequencing games are
balanced by checking all balancedness conditions. For n ¸ 5, no results on the balancedness of
relaxed sequencing games are known. Contrary to weak-relaxed sequencing games, the class of
relaxed sequencing games is not inbedded in the class of permutationally convex games.
Example 5 Consider Example 4. Let x 2 C(v). Because z(13) + z(24) = 4 + 4 = 8 = z(N) we
have that x1 + x3 = 4 and x2 + x4 = 4. Now z(123) = 5 implies that x1 + x2 + x3 ¸ 5 and thus
that x2 ¸ 1. Similarly it can be shown that xi ¸ 1 for all i 2 f1;3;4g. As z(i) = 0 for all i 2 N
we can conclude that x is not a marginal vector. Therefore no marginal vector is in the core, and
hence this game is not permutationally convex.
4 Rigid sequencing games
In this section we introduce rigid sequencing games and we prove that these games are balanced.
Rigid sequencing situations are situations in which there are ¯xed time slots, i.e. the machine is
programmed to start processing a new job on ¯xed times. Therefore, in rigid sequencing situations
only jobs that have equal processing time can be switched.
Let (N;¾0;®;p) be a sequencing situation. For coalition S ½ N a reordering ¾ is called rigid
admissible with respect to the initial order if it leaves NnS ¯xed and if switching takes place only
between players with equal processing time. Formally,
jP(¾0;j)j = jP(¾;j)j for all j 2 NnS
and
pi = pj for all i;j 2 N with i = ¾(j):
7By applying the Smith-rule to players with equal processing time, we can derive the optimal pro-
cessing order for each coalition S ½ N, i.e. an order is optimal if players with equal processing
time stand in decreasing order of urgency indices.
Let RIG(S) denote the set of rigid admissible rearrangements of coalition S ½ N. Then a rigid










The following example illustrates a rigid sequencing game and shows that not necessarily RIG(S) ½
A(S) or A(S) ½ RIG(S) for every S ½ N.
Example 6 Let (N;¾0;®;p) be a sequencing situation with N = f1;2;3g, ® = (2;3;5) and p =
(2;1;2). Then the corresponding rigid sequencing game (N;r) is displayed in the following table.
S 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
r(S) 0 0 0 0 9 0 9.
Table 3: Rigid sequencing game.
Because p1 = p3 6= p2 it holds that r(12) = r(23) = 0 and r(13) = max(0;®3(p1+p2)¡®1(p2+p3)) =
max(0;9) = 9. Further, observe that A(f1;2g) = f123;213g whereas RIG(f1;2g) = f1;2;3g, and
A(f1;3g) = f123g whereas RIG(f1;3g) = f123;321g.
The next theorem tells us that the rigid sequencing games have a nonempty core by showing that
rigid sequencing games are permutation games. A cooperative game (N;v) is called a permutation










for all S ½ N, S 6= ; and v(;) = 0, where ¼S is the set of all permutations of S and aij denote the
entries of A. In Tijs, Parthasarathy, Potters, Rajendra Prasad (1984) it is shown that permutation
games are balanced.
Theorem 2 Rigid sequencing games are balanced.
Proof: We show that rigid sequencing games are permutation games. Let (N;¾0;®;p) be a se-
quencing situation and let (N;r) be the corresponding rigid sequencing game. Let a be such that
aij =
½
®iC¾;j if pi = pj
1 else
For coalition S ½ N a reordering is rigid admissible if and only if it is a permutation of players









i2S ai¾(i)), where the last equality follows from ®ij = 1 if pi 6= pj. ¤











and let (N;z) be the corresponding permutation game. Then N = f1;2;3g, z(i) = 0 for i 2
f1;2;3g, z(12) = z(13) = z(23) = 2 and z(N) = 3. Suppose this game is a rigid sequencing
game (N;r). Because all two-player coalitions have values strictly larger than 0, it follows that
p1 = p2 = p3. Now z(12) = r(12) = g12 = 2 and v(23) = r(23) = g23 = 2. But this implies that
r(N) = g12 + g13 + g23 ¸ g12 + g23 = 4 > 3 = z(N). Therefore we may conclude that the class of
rigid sequencing games is a proper subset of the class of permutation games.
5 References
Borm P., Fiestras-Janeiro G., Hamers H., S¶ anchez E., Voorneveld M. (2002), On the convexity
of games corresponding to sequencing situations with due dates, European Journal of Operations Research,
136, 616-634.
Calleja P., Borm P., Hamers H., Klijn F., Slikker M. (2001), On a new class of parallel sequencing
situations and related games, CentER Discussion Paper 2001-3 (to appear in Annals of OR).
Curiel I., Pederzoli G., Tijs S. (1989), Sequencing games, European journal of Operational Research,
42, 344-351.
Curiel I., Potters J., Rajendra Prasad V., Tijs S., Veltman B. (1993), Cooperation in One Ma-
chine Scheduling, Zeitschrift fÄ ur Operations Research 38, 113-129.
Curiel I., Potters J., Rajendra Prasad V., Tijs S., Veltman B. (1994), Sequencing and coopera-
tion, Operations Research, 42, 566-568.
Granot D., Huberman G. (1982), The relationship between convex games and minimum cost spanning
tree games: a case for permutationally convex games, SIAM Journal of Algebra and Discrete Methods, 3,
288-292.
Hamers H. (1988), Master's thesis Mathematics, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands (in Dutch).
Hamers H., Borm P., Tijs S. (1995), On games corresponding to sequencing situations with ready times,
Mathematical Programming, 70, 1-13.
Hamers H., Klijn F., Suijs J. (1999), On the balancedness of multimachine sequencing games, European
Journal of Operational Research, 119, 678-691.
Hamers H., Klijn F., Velzen van B. (2002), On the convexity sequencing games with precedence cons-
triants, Working paper.
Hamers H., Suijs J., Tijs S., Borm P. (1996), The split core for sequencing games, Games and Economic
Behavior, 25, 165-176.
Nouweland van den A., Krabbenborg M., Potters J. (1992), Flowshops with a dominant machine,
European Journal of Operational Research, 62, 38-46.
Potter J., Reijnierse H. (1995), ¡-component additive games, International Journal of Game Theory,
24, 49-56.
Shapley L. (1971), Cores of convex games, International Journal of Game Theory, 1, 11-26.
Smith W. (1956), Various optimizers for single-stage production, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 3,
59-66.
Tijs S., Parthasarathy T., Potters J., Rajendra Prasad V. (1984), Permutation games: another
class of totally balanced games. OR Spektrum, 6, 119-123.
9